Last night I went to the Bulls game against the Washington Wizards. Below are some thoughts I had after the game:
-I assumed that Thabo Sefolosha and Adrian Griffin would be out with injuries last night, but I was hoping we would get to see Ben Gordon for the first time this season. Gordon sat out once against with a left ankle injury.
-I was suprised Gordon was out again, considering Skiles said he would possibly play in last week's game against Dallas.
-I like how the Bulls made an effort right from the tip to post-up Luol Deng. With Roger Mason and Mike Hall on him, Deng clearly has an advantage. Considering his height and wingspan, Deng should continue to take advantage of that mismatch.
-I loved the big lineup that Skiles went with mid-way through the first quarter, which included: Kirk Hinrich at point guard, Luol Deng at shooting guard, Andres Nocioni at small forward, Tyrus Thomas at power forward, and Ben Wallace at center. That is a unique lineup that can play many different styles of basketball.
-I really like how Skiles is utilizing the preseason effectively: different lineups, Deng in the post, Thomas Gardner playing with the starters, seeing what Aaron Gray can do in the post, playing JamesOn Curry at both guard positions, and giving significant time to Viktor Khryapa.
-Antawn Jamison got tangled up in the corner opposite of the Wizards bench towards the end of the first quarter. Shortly after, Andray Blatche came up lame after finishing at the basket.
-Washington's rookie guard, Nick Young, really played well last night. He seems like he can play three positions if asked and plays aggresively. Of all the Wizards, he impressed me the most.
-I watched Gilbert Arenas throughout the evening frequently. I like the way he carries himself and leads his team. He did not play his best and only played limited minutes. I would really love to watch him live again during a big regular season game.
-Both Caron Butler and DeShawn Stevenson did not play last night for the Wizards.
-By my account, Oleksiy Pecherov may one day be a signifcant player in the NBA. However, last night I could tell that he is still very raw. He struggled from the perimter and turned the ball over a great deal. He works hard out there but still seems like he is not ready to significantly contribute to an NBA team today.
-At this point, I think I have seen enough to determine who my fifteen man roster that I would go into the regular season would be: Hinrich, Duhon, JamesOn Curry at point guard; Gordon, Gardner, Sefolosha at shooting guard; Deng, Nocioni, Griffin, and Khryapa at small forward; Smith, Thomas, and Noah at power forward; Wallace and Gray at center. I would assume that Khryapa and either Curry or Gardner, probably Curry, would be inactive on game nights.
-Both Jared Homan and Andre Barrett have not played poorly during the preseason, but they lack the talent the players ahead of them have.
-I really like the Joe Smith acquisition John Paxson made in the offseason. He is an experienced veteran, who really wants to win now. I do not think he is "over-the-hill" at this point, and can still be effective. If he can play twenty minutes a night and average ten points and six rebounds, then the Bulls will be in great shape.
Wednesday, October 17, 2007
Monday, October 15, 2007
Follow-up on "Wages of Wins" Review
In response to the New York Times' review of "Wages of Wins", the author, David Berri, posted some thoughts on his website:
Having reviewed some of the reaction to his story, though, I thought it would be useful to summarize what our research indicates about decision-making in the NBA. Here is a point-by-point summary of the story we are telling about the NBA.
Payroll does not explain much of wins in the NBA, MLB, or NFL. Specifically, payroll only explains 12% of the variation in wins in the NBA. In baseball explanatory power is 18% while in the NFL it is below 5%.
We think the low explanatory power of payroll in baseball and football can at least partially be explained by the relative inconsistency of performance in these sports. As we note in our book, across time in baseball and football we see fairly wide variations in player productivity. After all, who expected the Detroit Tigers to be so good this year?
Relative to these sports, though, performance in the NBA is more consistent. So why is payroll still unable to explain much of wins?
We think the answer lies in how players are evaluated in the NBA. For more than two decades economists have looked at the link between player salary and various performance statistics. Scoring totals are the only player statistic that consistently explains player pay. Shooting efficiency, rebounds, steals, and turnovers do not consistently offer much explanatory power. We updated these studies in our book. Our story, though, was essentially the same. Scoring totals are the one statistic that matters most in determining player pay.
How much players are paid is not the only decision economists have examined. Ha Hoang and Dan Rascher published a study in Industrial Relations in 1999. The Hoang and Rascher study looked at the factors that caused a player to be cut from an NBA roster. The only player statistic these researchers found to matter was scoring. All other player statistics did not matter.
We have looked at the coaches voting for the All-Rookie team and the factors that impact where a college player is drafted. What matters most? Again, scoring matters more than factors associated with getting possession of the ball (i.e. rebounds, turnovers, and steals).
Wins in the NBA, though, are not just about scoring. Possession factors have a large impact on the outcomes we observe in the NBA. When you look at all the statistics the NBA tracks you find that with these you can explain 95% of the variation in wins. And when you look at all these statistics you find that you can create a very accurate estimate of the wins each player produces.
From all this what do we conclude? Conventional wisdom in basketball is incorrect. Players who only score are not as valuable as people think. Players who do not score much — like Ben Wallace and Dennis Rodman – have a bigger impact on team wins than people seem to think.
Having reviewed some of the reaction to his story, though, I thought it would be useful to summarize what our research indicates about decision-making in the NBA. Here is a point-by-point summary of the story we are telling about the NBA.
Payroll does not explain much of wins in the NBA, MLB, or NFL. Specifically, payroll only explains 12% of the variation in wins in the NBA. In baseball explanatory power is 18% while in the NFL it is below 5%.
We think the low explanatory power of payroll in baseball and football can at least partially be explained by the relative inconsistency of performance in these sports. As we note in our book, across time in baseball and football we see fairly wide variations in player productivity. After all, who expected the Detroit Tigers to be so good this year?
Relative to these sports, though, performance in the NBA is more consistent. So why is payroll still unable to explain much of wins?
We think the answer lies in how players are evaluated in the NBA. For more than two decades economists have looked at the link between player salary and various performance statistics. Scoring totals are the only player statistic that consistently explains player pay. Shooting efficiency, rebounds, steals, and turnovers do not consistently offer much explanatory power. We updated these studies in our book. Our story, though, was essentially the same. Scoring totals are the one statistic that matters most in determining player pay.
How much players are paid is not the only decision economists have examined. Ha Hoang and Dan Rascher published a study in Industrial Relations in 1999. The Hoang and Rascher study looked at the factors that caused a player to be cut from an NBA roster. The only player statistic these researchers found to matter was scoring. All other player statistics did not matter.
We have looked at the coaches voting for the All-Rookie team and the factors that impact where a college player is drafted. What matters most? Again, scoring matters more than factors associated with getting possession of the ball (i.e. rebounds, turnovers, and steals).
Wins in the NBA, though, are not just about scoring. Possession factors have a large impact on the outcomes we observe in the NBA. When you look at all the statistics the NBA tracks you find that with these you can explain 95% of the variation in wins. And when you look at all these statistics you find that you can create a very accurate estimate of the wins each player produces.
From all this what do we conclude? Conventional wisdom in basketball is incorrect. Players who only score are not as valuable as people think. Players who do not score much — like Ben Wallace and Dennis Rodman – have a bigger impact on team wins than people seem to think.
Thursday, October 11, 2007
Does High Payroll Lead to Success?
Rick Karcher of "Sports Law Blog" posted his "2007 MLB Team Payroll Report Card" on Tuesday.
Karcher writes:
"At the end of each regular baseball season, I compare the payrolls of all the teams to see what kind of impact payroll disparity had on overall team performance for the year. [See my 2005 annual report card and 2006 annual report card.] This year's report card, once again, reveals that high payroll simply does not equal success. For purposes of this report, I measure success by which teams make the playoffs because I truly believe that each playoff team has an equal chance of winning the World Series. Once you get to the playoffs, it becomes a matter of timing, luck, molecular attraction and star alignment (in support of this proposition I cite to Annie Savoy from Bull Durham)."
At the end of his post, Karcher sums up his thoughts:
"I walk away with the same conclusion each year. The $50-$70 million range seems to make the most business sense. Looking at the salary data on an aggregate basis, only four of the eight teams in the playoffs are in the top 1/3 in payroll (more than $90M). And three of the eight teams actually fall in the bottom 1/3 in payroll (less than $70M)."
Karcher writes:
"At the end of each regular baseball season, I compare the payrolls of all the teams to see what kind of impact payroll disparity had on overall team performance for the year. [See my 2005 annual report card and 2006 annual report card.] This year's report card, once again, reveals that high payroll simply does not equal success. For purposes of this report, I measure success by which teams make the playoffs because I truly believe that each playoff team has an equal chance of winning the World Series. Once you get to the playoffs, it becomes a matter of timing, luck, molecular attraction and star alignment (in support of this proposition I cite to Annie Savoy from Bull Durham)."
At the end of his post, Karcher sums up his thoughts:
"I walk away with the same conclusion each year. The $50-$70 million range seems to make the most business sense. Looking at the salary data on an aggregate basis, only four of the eight teams in the playoffs are in the top 1/3 in payroll (more than $90M). And three of the eight teams actually fall in the bottom 1/3 in payroll (less than $70M)."
Wednesday, October 10, 2007
Cleveland's Restricted Free Agent Quandry
"Cavs at forefront of NBA restraint"
Brian Windhorst
Published on Tuesday, Oct 09, 2007
There are a lot of eyes on the Cavaliers' front office these days, and it's not fans wondering when Anderson Varejao and Sasha Pavlovic are going to get signed.
Right now, the Cavs are serving as a giant test case a precedent setter for the way business is going to be handled in the NBA, and other organizations are watching carefully. The stakes are high.
Let's see if we can make this simple without launching into a deep economic diatribe. The summers of 2004, 2005 and 2006 featured record spending in the NBA. Part of it was due to a new collective bargaining agreement in 2005 that bolstered the salary cap.
Lots of max contracts were given out, numerous teams had, and used, giant amounts of cap space; lots of teams used their entire mid-level exceptions to sign mid-level players to contracts worth more than $35 million; and lots of restricted free agents got huge deals without having to get legitimate offers elsewhere.
That was the flow, now is the ebb.
With the luxury tax now known before the season and after three years of big spending, there is a recession in the NBA.
Only one team this summer, the Toronto Raptors, used its full mid-level exception on one player. Only two free agents, Rashard Lewis and Darko Milicic, changed teams for more than the mid-level exception. There were no sign-and-trade deals of significance. The market is different, and the Cavs and everybody else know it.
So here come Varejao and Pavlovic, guys coming off career seasons and looking around at their peers who got paid the past three summers. That includes their teammates. Larry Hughes, Damon Jones and Donyell Marshall all got big contracts from the Cavs in 2005, when more than a half-dozen teams had a load of cap space.
Varejao and Pavlovic want their piece of the pie, and who could blame them? Except, the pie has changed.
Varejao and Pavlovic and their agents seem to be in denial about it. Which is why they are getting so radical by attempting unprecedented holdouts to apply pressure to the Cavs. It's their attempt to buck the market.
The Cavs, looking around the league and at their highest payroll ever this season, are standing firm and refusing to pay more than the market dictates. In 2005, it dictated that a guard with Jones' track record was worth four years and $16 million. He got it. It was a market-value deal at the time.
In 2007, not a single team can offer Varejao a deal starting at more than $5.3 million this season. So why would the Cavs pay him the $9 million he wants? Varejao's side is betting the Cavs will fold under the pressure of his absence. Most of the league is watching, but shares the Cavs' viewpoint.
Here's the other factor: As things stand today, next summer appears to be just as tight. There will be a couple more teams with salary-cap space than this summer, but the free-agent class is much deeper. Being a free agent again, as Varejao and Pavlovic could've been if they took one-year qualifying offers, might not be a smart move.
However, in 2009 and probably again in 2010, many of those contracts signed between 2004-06 will expire. It appears as if the league again will be awash in available cash. That's when you want to be a free agent. Not now.
This is what Varejao and Pavlovic should focus on: getting paid for a few years and taking another bite when the money is flowing again. The offers the Cavs put on the table would've given both players huge raises for the next few years. In Varejao's case, he easily can make five times more in the next two years than he did in his first three seasons combined.
Instead, they appear to be waiting to hit that home run. Here's the rub: Nobody in the league right now is pitching.
Brian Windhorst
Published on Tuesday, Oct 09, 2007
There are a lot of eyes on the Cavaliers' front office these days, and it's not fans wondering when Anderson Varejao and Sasha Pavlovic are going to get signed.
Right now, the Cavs are serving as a giant test case a precedent setter for the way business is going to be handled in the NBA, and other organizations are watching carefully. The stakes are high.
Let's see if we can make this simple without launching into a deep economic diatribe. The summers of 2004, 2005 and 2006 featured record spending in the NBA. Part of it was due to a new collective bargaining agreement in 2005 that bolstered the salary cap.
Lots of max contracts were given out, numerous teams had, and used, giant amounts of cap space; lots of teams used their entire mid-level exceptions to sign mid-level players to contracts worth more than $35 million; and lots of restricted free agents got huge deals without having to get legitimate offers elsewhere.
That was the flow, now is the ebb.
With the luxury tax now known before the season and after three years of big spending, there is a recession in the NBA.
Only one team this summer, the Toronto Raptors, used its full mid-level exception on one player. Only two free agents, Rashard Lewis and Darko Milicic, changed teams for more than the mid-level exception. There were no sign-and-trade deals of significance. The market is different, and the Cavs and everybody else know it.
So here come Varejao and Pavlovic, guys coming off career seasons and looking around at their peers who got paid the past three summers. That includes their teammates. Larry Hughes, Damon Jones and Donyell Marshall all got big contracts from the Cavs in 2005, when more than a half-dozen teams had a load of cap space.
Varejao and Pavlovic want their piece of the pie, and who could blame them? Except, the pie has changed.
Varejao and Pavlovic and their agents seem to be in denial about it. Which is why they are getting so radical by attempting unprecedented holdouts to apply pressure to the Cavs. It's their attempt to buck the market.
The Cavs, looking around the league and at their highest payroll ever this season, are standing firm and refusing to pay more than the market dictates. In 2005, it dictated that a guard with Jones' track record was worth four years and $16 million. He got it. It was a market-value deal at the time.
In 2007, not a single team can offer Varejao a deal starting at more than $5.3 million this season. So why would the Cavs pay him the $9 million he wants? Varejao's side is betting the Cavs will fold under the pressure of his absence. Most of the league is watching, but shares the Cavs' viewpoint.
Here's the other factor: As things stand today, next summer appears to be just as tight. There will be a couple more teams with salary-cap space than this summer, but the free-agent class is much deeper. Being a free agent again, as Varejao and Pavlovic could've been if they took one-year qualifying offers, might not be a smart move.
However, in 2009 and probably again in 2010, many of those contracts signed between 2004-06 will expire. It appears as if the league again will be awash in available cash. That's when you want to be a free agent. Not now.
This is what Varejao and Pavlovic should focus on: getting paid for a few years and taking another bite when the money is flowing again. The offers the Cavs put on the table would've given both players huge raises for the next few years. In Varejao's case, he easily can make five times more in the next two years than he did in his first three seasons combined.
Instead, they appear to be waiting to hit that home run. Here's the rub: Nobody in the league right now is pitching.
Friday, October 5, 2007
Training Camp Begins, Time for Eastern Conference Rankings
With NBA training camps having begun this week, I thought it would be a good time to provide my power rankings for the Eastern Conference:
Contenders
1) Detroit Pistons - The key pieces from a 53-win team, plus the addition of some promising rookies lead me to put Detroit on top of the East.
2) Chicago Bulls - Seven of the Bulls top eight from last season return, plus two new big men - Joakim Noah and Joe Smith.
3) Boston Celtics - The Hall of Fame trio will certainly contend for the conference championship. Injuries and the development of their young players will be the determining factor here.
4) Cleveland Cavaliers - With Ilgauskas and Marshall a year older, the development of Cedric Simmons, Shannon Brown, and Daniel Gibson will be vital.
Pretenders
5) New Jersey Nets - I don't buy Jamaal Magliore being the missing piece to the Nets' puzzle. I would expect the Nets to play more consistently throughout the season, but never truely contend for the title.
6) Miami Heat - Too many injuries to key players and a lack of talented youth has the Heat as a fringe playoff team.
Sleepers
7) Washington Wizards - The Wizards certainly have a talented roster this season, but likely are a talented center short of moving up the power ranking.
8) Orlando Magic - Adding Rashard Lewis is worth at minimum five wins to their regular season total. The Magic are still short on talent around Dwight Howard and Lewis to make a serious run in the East.
9) Toronto Raptors - With a majority of the Eastern Conference teams improving this offseason, the Raptors only made minor tweaks to their roster. The development of Andrea Bargnani and T.J. Ford will determine the success of this team.
Losers
10) New York Knicks - Zach Randolph was a strong addition to the Knicks roster, but they will have all types of trouble playing defense this year.
11) Atlanta Hawks - The Hawks have a young roster with loads of potential. Finding a reliable point guard to lead them will be vital in their success.
12) Charlotte Bobcats - I like Charlotte's starting five now, but they lack depth at every position. If they can keep their core together for years to come, they will be a contender soon.
13) Milwaukee Bucks - The Bucks had an active offseason, but still have plenty of question marks. What will Yi Jianlian bring them? Can Charlie Villanueva stay healthy? Do they need more of a true point guard?
14) Indiana Pacers - The Pacers may see themselves trading Jermaine O'Neal and Jamaal Tinsley by midseason and starting over around Danny Granger and Mike Dunleavy Jr.
15) Philadelphia 76ers - The 76ers have some nice pieces in Andre Iguodala, Jason Smith, Rodney Carney and Thaddeus Young, but they lack a consistent veteran post scorer.
Contenders
1) Detroit Pistons - The key pieces from a 53-win team, plus the addition of some promising rookies lead me to put Detroit on top of the East.
2) Chicago Bulls - Seven of the Bulls top eight from last season return, plus two new big men - Joakim Noah and Joe Smith.
3) Boston Celtics - The Hall of Fame trio will certainly contend for the conference championship. Injuries and the development of their young players will be the determining factor here.
4) Cleveland Cavaliers - With Ilgauskas and Marshall a year older, the development of Cedric Simmons, Shannon Brown, and Daniel Gibson will be vital.
Pretenders
5) New Jersey Nets - I don't buy Jamaal Magliore being the missing piece to the Nets' puzzle. I would expect the Nets to play more consistently throughout the season, but never truely contend for the title.
6) Miami Heat - Too many injuries to key players and a lack of talented youth has the Heat as a fringe playoff team.
Sleepers
7) Washington Wizards - The Wizards certainly have a talented roster this season, but likely are a talented center short of moving up the power ranking.
8) Orlando Magic - Adding Rashard Lewis is worth at minimum five wins to their regular season total. The Magic are still short on talent around Dwight Howard and Lewis to make a serious run in the East.
9) Toronto Raptors - With a majority of the Eastern Conference teams improving this offseason, the Raptors only made minor tweaks to their roster. The development of Andrea Bargnani and T.J. Ford will determine the success of this team.
Losers
10) New York Knicks - Zach Randolph was a strong addition to the Knicks roster, but they will have all types of trouble playing defense this year.
11) Atlanta Hawks - The Hawks have a young roster with loads of potential. Finding a reliable point guard to lead them will be vital in their success.
12) Charlotte Bobcats - I like Charlotte's starting five now, but they lack depth at every position. If they can keep their core together for years to come, they will be a contender soon.
13) Milwaukee Bucks - The Bucks had an active offseason, but still have plenty of question marks. What will Yi Jianlian bring them? Can Charlie Villanueva stay healthy? Do they need more of a true point guard?
14) Indiana Pacers - The Pacers may see themselves trading Jermaine O'Neal and Jamaal Tinsley by midseason and starting over around Danny Granger and Mike Dunleavy Jr.
15) Philadelphia 76ers - The 76ers have some nice pieces in Andre Iguodala, Jason Smith, Rodney Carney and Thaddeus Young, but they lack a consistent veteran post scorer.
Review on "Wages of Wins"
I was reading The New Yorker's review on "The Wages of Wins" by David Berri from May 29, 2006 earlier today. I have not read the book and was interested in reading Malcolm Gladwell's review. Two sections of the review stoodout to me:
The first:
In “The Wages of Wins” (Stanford; $29.95), the economists David J. Berri, Martin B. Schmidt, and Stacey L. Brook set out to solve the Iverson problem. Weighing the relative value of fouls, rebounds, shots taken, turnovers, and the like, they’ve created an algorithm that, they argue, comes closer than any previous statistical measure to capturing the true value of a basketball player. The algorithm yields what they call a Win Score, because it expresses a player’s worth as the number of wins that his contributions bring to his team. According to their analysis, Iverson’s finest season was in 2004-05, when he was worth ten wins, which made him the thirty-sixth-best player in the league. In the season in which he won the Most Valuable Player award, he was the ninety-first-best player in the league. In his worst season (2003-04), he was the two-hundred-and-twenty-seventh-best player in the league. On average, for his career, he has ranked a hundred and sixteenth. In some years, Iverson has not even been the best player on his own team. Looking at the findings that Berri, Schmidt, and Brook present is enough to make one wonder what exactly basketball experts—coaches, managers, sportswriters—know about basketball.
The second:
Most egregious is the story of a young guard for the Chicago Bulls named Ben Gordon. Last season, Gordon finished second in the Rookie of the Year voting and was named the league’s top “sixth man”—that is, the best non-starter—because he averaged an impressive 15.1 points per game in limited playing time. But Gordon rebounds less than he should, turns over the ball frequently, and makes such a low percentage of his shots that, of the N.B.A.’s top thirty-three scorers—that is, players who score at least one point for every two minutes on the floor—Gordon’s Win Score ranked him dead last.
At some point, I would like to read this book and dive further into Berri's calculations and thoughts.
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/05/29/060529crbo_books1?currentPage=1
The first:
In “The Wages of Wins” (Stanford; $29.95), the economists David J. Berri, Martin B. Schmidt, and Stacey L. Brook set out to solve the Iverson problem. Weighing the relative value of fouls, rebounds, shots taken, turnovers, and the like, they’ve created an algorithm that, they argue, comes closer than any previous statistical measure to capturing the true value of a basketball player. The algorithm yields what they call a Win Score, because it expresses a player’s worth as the number of wins that his contributions bring to his team. According to their analysis, Iverson’s finest season was in 2004-05, when he was worth ten wins, which made him the thirty-sixth-best player in the league. In the season in which he won the Most Valuable Player award, he was the ninety-first-best player in the league. In his worst season (2003-04), he was the two-hundred-and-twenty-seventh-best player in the league. On average, for his career, he has ranked a hundred and sixteenth. In some years, Iverson has not even been the best player on his own team. Looking at the findings that Berri, Schmidt, and Brook present is enough to make one wonder what exactly basketball experts—coaches, managers, sportswriters—know about basketball.
The second:
Most egregious is the story of a young guard for the Chicago Bulls named Ben Gordon. Last season, Gordon finished second in the Rookie of the Year voting and was named the league’s top “sixth man”—that is, the best non-starter—because he averaged an impressive 15.1 points per game in limited playing time. But Gordon rebounds less than he should, turns over the ball frequently, and makes such a low percentage of his shots that, of the N.B.A.’s top thirty-three scorers—that is, players who score at least one point for every two minutes on the floor—Gordon’s Win Score ranked him dead last.
At some point, I would like to read this book and dive further into Berri's calculations and thoughts.
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/05/29/060529crbo_books1?currentPage=1
Thursday, October 4, 2007
Cardinals Fire GM Walt Jocketty
Jocketty got a raw deal
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
http://insider.espn.go.com/espn/blog/index?entryID=3048182&name=law_keith
What exactly does a GM have to do these days to keep his job?
Walt Jocketty spent 13 seasons at the helm of the St. Louis Cardinals. In that time, they racked up seven playoff appearances, three National League pennants and a World Championship (an unlikely one, but still, the flag looks the same). Their seven-year run of winning seasons was snapped this year, due in no small part to injuries to Chris Carpenter, Scott Rolen and Jim Edmonds, and 2007 marked just the fourth losing season in Jocketty's tenure.
Jocketty was let go due to non-baseball reasons, but sometimes the baseball reasons need to win out. His track record at the major league level includes some outstanding moves:
• He picked up Rolen for a young Placido Polanco back in 2002. Rolen was a star at the time having a down year, with Dallas Green killing him in the press at every opportunity; Rolen hit 15 homers in two-plus months with the Cardinals, finished fourth in the MVP voting in 2004 as he had his best year and the Cardinals won the pennant, and had another excellent year in 2006 before injuries wrecked his season this year. Polanco became a great hitter for average starting in 2005, but the value Rolen provided in the short term made this a slam-dunk for the Cardinals.
• He acquired Edmonds for Kent Bottenfield and then-prospect Adam Kennedy. Bottenfield was out of the majors for good inside of 15 months and Kennedy eventually developed into a fringy regular, but Edmonds became a star, hitting 172 homers with a .410 OBP over the next five years, with great defense in center.
• He picked up a broken-down Carpenter after the 2002 season, and while Carpenter needed another shoulder surgery before he was able to pitch for the Cards, he turned in three fantastic years, winning a Cy Young Award and coming in third the following year. While Jocketty eventually gave Carpenter a huge contract extension, the cost of the initial pickup was minimal; Carpenter came to St. Louis because the Cards offered him a spot on the 40-man roster and Toronto wouldn't.
• He traded an underachieving and soon-to-be-free-agent J.D. Drew to Atlanta for Jason Marquis and Adam Wainwright. Marquis gave the Cardinals two solid years before one awful one, while Wainwright became the closer on the 2006 championship club before becoming an above-average starter this year. Drew spent one year with the Braves before leaving as a free agent.
If Jocketty has had a major failing, it's that the Cardinals' farm system was not especially productive during his tenure, but that area of the business was taken away from him over the last two years, and the team's drafts in that time have not been particularly strong. And that leads into the real reason for the friction that led to Jocketty's departure: the rise of Jeff Luhnow, hired by owner Bill DeWitt and handed increasing amounts of responsibility within baseball operations, to the detriment of several of Jocketty's longtime lieutenants. This situation, where the general manager did not have full authority over his team's scouting and player developments, appears to be unique within the game, and it's all the more unusual given Jocketty's track record and reputation.
St. Louis is now in a difficult spot. If it's true that Luhnow -- who apparently won't be a candidate for the GM position -- is untouchable due to his relationship with the team's primary owner, many GM candidates with backgrounds in either scouting or player development will balk at the position because of how limited their control will be. They may be forced to fill the position from within (John Mozeliak, their former scouting director and now the interim GM, would be a solid choice), or to accept a candidate whose interest in being GM supersedes his concern at the lack of control. Jocketty, meanwhile, should have his pick of positions, as many teams would be thrilled to obtain a GM with his reputation and track record, and you can bet that one of his first questions for a prospective employer will be, "Can I pick my own scouting director?"
Wednesday, October 3, 2007
http://insider.espn.go.com/espn/blog/index?entryID=3048182&name=law_keith
What exactly does a GM have to do these days to keep his job?
Walt Jocketty spent 13 seasons at the helm of the St. Louis Cardinals. In that time, they racked up seven playoff appearances, three National League pennants and a World Championship (an unlikely one, but still, the flag looks the same). Their seven-year run of winning seasons was snapped this year, due in no small part to injuries to Chris Carpenter, Scott Rolen and Jim Edmonds, and 2007 marked just the fourth losing season in Jocketty's tenure.
Jocketty was let go due to non-baseball reasons, but sometimes the baseball reasons need to win out. His track record at the major league level includes some outstanding moves:
• He picked up Rolen for a young Placido Polanco back in 2002. Rolen was a star at the time having a down year, with Dallas Green killing him in the press at every opportunity; Rolen hit 15 homers in two-plus months with the Cardinals, finished fourth in the MVP voting in 2004 as he had his best year and the Cardinals won the pennant, and had another excellent year in 2006 before injuries wrecked his season this year. Polanco became a great hitter for average starting in 2005, but the value Rolen provided in the short term made this a slam-dunk for the Cardinals.
• He acquired Edmonds for Kent Bottenfield and then-prospect Adam Kennedy. Bottenfield was out of the majors for good inside of 15 months and Kennedy eventually developed into a fringy regular, but Edmonds became a star, hitting 172 homers with a .410 OBP over the next five years, with great defense in center.
• He picked up a broken-down Carpenter after the 2002 season, and while Carpenter needed another shoulder surgery before he was able to pitch for the Cards, he turned in three fantastic years, winning a Cy Young Award and coming in third the following year. While Jocketty eventually gave Carpenter a huge contract extension, the cost of the initial pickup was minimal; Carpenter came to St. Louis because the Cards offered him a spot on the 40-man roster and Toronto wouldn't.
• He traded an underachieving and soon-to-be-free-agent J.D. Drew to Atlanta for Jason Marquis and Adam Wainwright. Marquis gave the Cardinals two solid years before one awful one, while Wainwright became the closer on the 2006 championship club before becoming an above-average starter this year. Drew spent one year with the Braves before leaving as a free agent.
If Jocketty has had a major failing, it's that the Cardinals' farm system was not especially productive during his tenure, but that area of the business was taken away from him over the last two years, and the team's drafts in that time have not been particularly strong. And that leads into the real reason for the friction that led to Jocketty's departure: the rise of Jeff Luhnow, hired by owner Bill DeWitt and handed increasing amounts of responsibility within baseball operations, to the detriment of several of Jocketty's longtime lieutenants. This situation, where the general manager did not have full authority over his team's scouting and player developments, appears to be unique within the game, and it's all the more unusual given Jocketty's track record and reputation.
St. Louis is now in a difficult spot. If it's true that Luhnow -- who apparently won't be a candidate for the GM position -- is untouchable due to his relationship with the team's primary owner, many GM candidates with backgrounds in either scouting or player development will balk at the position because of how limited their control will be. They may be forced to fill the position from within (John Mozeliak, their former scouting director and now the interim GM, would be a solid choice), or to accept a candidate whose interest in being GM supersedes his concern at the lack of control. Jocketty, meanwhile, should have his pick of positions, as many teams would be thrilled to obtain a GM with his reputation and track record, and you can bet that one of his first questions for a prospective employer will be, "Can I pick my own scouting director?"
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